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Abstract
Research on organizational misconduct has examined how audiences generate discourses to 
make sense of behaviour that may transgress the line between right and wrong. However, when 
organizations are accused of misconduct, the resulting ambiguity also opens opportunities for 
organizations and their members to generate discourses aimed at deflecting blame. Little is known 
about how actors who are at risk of being held responsible actively respond to misconduct 
accusations by engaging in discursive strategies. To address this question, we build on crisis 
communication and discourse theory to integrate processes of scapegoating and whistleblowing 
into a holistic model. We develop a blame game theory – conceptualizing the sequence of 
discursive strategies employed by an organization and its members to strategically shift blame by 
attributing responsibility to others or denying misconduct. Our model identifies four blame game 
pathways as a function of two types of ambiguity: moral ambiguity and attributional ambiguity. 
We highlight accusations of misconduct as pivotal triggering events in the social construction of 
misconduct. By conceptualizing the discursive dynamics of strategic reactions to accusations of 
misconduct, our blame game theory contributes to the literature on organizational misconduct 
and has implications for research on social evaluations.
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2 Organization Theory 
A man may fail many times but he isn’t a 
failure until he begins to blame  
somebody else.
Jean-Paul Getty (1892–1976), American petrol 
tycoon and industrialist
An extensive body of research has looked at 
organizational misconduct – ‘a behavior in or 
by an organization [that is judged] to transgress 
a line separating right from wrong’ (Greve, 
Palmer, & Pozner, 2010, p. 56). As the line 
between right and wrong is blurry and can be 
manipulated, misconduct can be considered to 
be socially constructed (Palmer, 2012). A criti-
cal point in this social construction is when an 
organization is accused of misconduct. When 
such an accusation is made, it is still to be deter-
mined whether misconduct really took place 
and, if so, who was responsible (Faulkner, 
2011). The organization’s behaviour is subse-
quently evaluated by external audiences – 
groups of actors who actively try to make sense 
of a situation (Radoynovska & King, 2019; 
Roulet, 2020) – and judgements are made about 
its wrongfulness (Mohliver, 2019; Palmer, 
2013). This audience evaluation is therefore 
often associated with negative outcomes such 
as a reputational penalty for the accused organi-
zation (Coombs & Holladay, 2006).
To date, however, the literature on misconduct 
has neglected the role of accusations in the social 
construction of misconduct, even though accusa-
tions are pivotal triggering events that expose this 
social construction (see Palmer, 2014). We there-
fore know little about how the dynamics that 
unfold following an accusation of misconduct 
contribute to the social construction of miscon-
duct and, in particular, about how the accused 
organization itself responds to allegations of mis-
conduct and influences its social construction. At 
the same time, the nature of the situation follow-
ing an accusation of misconduct makes it highly 
likely that the accused organization will respond 
strategically and influence the social construction 
of misconduct (Butler, Serra, & Spagnolo, 2020).
Accusations of misconduct are highly ambig-
uous in that they can be interpreted in multiple 
ways, and this ambiguity makes it difficult for 
external audiences to evaluate the accusation 
(Faulkner, 2011). The accused organization 
therefore has both the incentive and opportunity 
to try to influence audiences’ evaluation of the 
situation. In other words, the ambiguity of the 
situation creates the potential for a strategic 
response by the accused actor. It is important to 
take this potential into account to advance our 
understanding of how the social construction of 
misconduct unfolds following an accusation.
To account for the potential of strategic 
responses by actors accused of misconduct, we 
suggest adopting a discursive perspective of mis-
conduct. Because ‘morality originates from and 
is situated in every day discourse’ (Shadnam & 
Lawrence, 2011, p. 384), we see discourse as 
central to the process of the social construction 
of misconduct. Audiences collectively construct 
misconduct through discourses (Clemente & 
Gabbioneta, 2017). Misconduct is constructed 
when audiences generate discourses that desig-
nate a behaviour as crossing the line between 
right and wrong, and consequently as condemn-
able (Roulet, 2020). After an accusation of 
organizational misconduct has been made – for 
example, through the media pointing out a trans-
gression (Palmer, Greenwood, & Smith-Crowe, 
2016; Roulet & Clemente, 2018) – there is the 
opportunity for such discourses to emerge (Adut, 
2005). In addition to evaluating whether the 
behaviour crossed the line between right and 
wrong – thereby constructing its moral status – 
these discourses also determine who should be 
held accountable for the misbehaviour and thus 
attribute responsibility (Allport, 1979). The iden-
tification of responsible parties relies on dis-
courses because of ambiguity in the attributional 
process (Jacquart & Antonakis, 2015): external 
and internal audiences can both only make more 
or less plausible inferences about who is respon-
sible for misconduct (Johansen, Aggerholm, & 
Frandsen, 2012). Therefore, both the moral eval-
uation of the scrutinized behaviour and the attri-
bution of responsibility for that behaviour will 
originate from discourses that emerge following 
the accusation. This characteristic in turn enables 
the accused actors to produce their own 
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discourses with the aim of influencing the social 
construction of misconduct by audiences.
We therefore turn our focus to the discursive 
reactions of the accused organization and its 
members following an accusation of misconduct. 
As the ambiguity inherent in such accusations 
opens space for discursive reactions, organiza-
tions at risk of being held responsible commonly 
generate discourses that attribute responsibility to 
others in order to avoid reputational penalties 
from being caught misbehaving (Coombs, 
2007a). Unfolding crises can also trigger blaming 
processes between organizational members when 
organizations are held responsible for misconduct 
(Gabriel, 2012; Gephart, 1993). This is because it 
is not just organizations that suffer a significant 
reputation penalty when they are seen to be 
responsible for misconduct (Coombs & Holladay, 
2006), but individual members can also suffer 
adverse outcomes, even after disassociating 
themselves from the tainted organization (Pozner 
& Harris, 2016; Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, & 
Hambrick, 2008). This context – in which both 
the accused organization and its members are at 
risk of being blamed – is characterized by differ-
ent types of ambiguity: ambiguity regarding the 
attribution of responsibility (Crocker, Voelkl, 
Testa, & Major, 1991) and ambiguity regarding 
the moral judgement of wrongdoing (Shadnam & 
Lawrence, 2011). Organizations and their mem-
bers are both likely to take this ambiguity into 
account when deciding to engage in discursive 
strategies which aim to minimize the conse-
quences of the blame they are exposed to. We use 
the term ‘blame game’ to refer to this collective 
and discursive phenomenon of social actors 
instrumentally positioning themselves to protect 
themselves and deflect blame. The Cambridge 
dictionary defines a blame game as ‘a situation in 
which people try to blame each other for some-
thing bad that has happened.’ We theorize blame 
games as sequences of discursive strategies 
aimed at deflecting blame, through which organi-
zations and their members respond to accusations 
of misconduct.
Our blame game theory enables us to bridge 
the gap between two well-studied phenomena in 
organization studies: scapegoating (Djabi & de 
Longueval, 2020) and whistleblowing (Kenny, 
2019). We integrate both into the notion of a 
blame game, seeing them as two sides of the 
same coin, as essentially blame-shifting discur-
sive strategies through which organizations and 
their members react to accusations of miscon-
duct. Coombs (2007a) identifies scapegoating as 
one of the primary organizational reactions: that 
is, blaming actors who are not necessarily 
responsible for a negative outcome but whom the 
organization can condemn to deflect blame away 
from itself (Boeker, 1992; Grint, 2010). For 
example, organizations can denounce so-called 
‘rogue’ employees. One example of scapegoat-
ing is the case of rogue trader Jerome Kerviel, 
who was held responsible for a €4.9 billion trad-
ing loss for Société Générale, one of the major 
European banks, in 2007 and 2008. The bank 
was facing a €7 billion loss and many other con-
troversies related to its involvement in the sub-
prime markets and its practices. The top 
management asked employees to stand together 
with them against the scapegoat. In this sense, 
scapegoating is a collective strategy for shifting 
blame from the focal collective actor to an indi-
vidual one through the creation of relevant 
discourses.
Individuals can also react to an accusation 
made against their organization and take a dis-
cursive position to limit contamination (Moore, 
Stuart, & Pozner, 2011). Organizational mem-
bers can engage in whistleblowing to blame 
wrongdoing on their organization as a whole 
(Culiberg & Mihelič, 2017; Near & Miceli, 
1985, 1995). While scapegoating is an organi-
zational strategy for shifting blame to a member 
of the organization, whistleblowing can be initi-
ated by individual members, for their own ben-
efit, to strategically shift blame to the 
organization (Choo, Grimm, Horváth, & Nitta, 
2019). In the context of the 2007–2008 finan-
cial crisis, some bankers decided to turn their 
backs on their former employers and industry. 
In March 2012, Greg Smith – executive director 
of the United States equity derivatives business 
at Goldman Sachs – published a resignation let-
ter as an op-ed in the New York Times. He 
pointed out a change in corporate culture, which 
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had switched from being client-oriented to a 
‘toxic and destructive’ environment where the 
norm was to ‘rip off’ the clients, often referred 
to in internal emails as ‘the muppets’.
In our model, we theorize different pathways 
through which blame games can unfold. To 
achieve this, we develop the concept of ambigu-
ity as the enabler and determinant of blame 
games and explore the interactions of different 
organizational and individual blame game strate-
gies. In doing so, we show how the blame game 
strategies of organizations and their members 
can coexist and succeed each other in a sequence 
of events. This enables us to integrate whistle-
blowing and scapegoating, traditionally explored 
in separate literatures, into a holistic model. We 
ask: what determines the discursive strategies 
employed by organizations and their members to 
deflect blame in the aftermath of accusations of 
misconduct? And when do blame games reach 
an end or a settlement? We identify a variety of 
blame game sequences and pathways through 
which blame is settled, depending on the level 
and form of ambiguity that is present following 
an accusation of misconduct. Overall, research 
on misconduct has to date given little attention to 
the role of ambiguity following accusations of 
misconduct and the resulting potential for strate-
gic responses by the accused actors. However, if 
these issues are not theorized, then our view of 
misconduct as being socially constructed will 
miss crucial pillars, meaning that the social con-
struction of misconduct is theoretically underde-
veloped. Our model addresses this essential blind 
spot by adopting a discursive perspective of mis-
conduct and by accommodating prior research 
on crisis communication and whistleblowing. 
The resulting blame game theory contributes 
specifically to the literature on organizational 
misconduct and more broadly to the literature on 
social evaluations.
A Discursive Perspective of 
Organizational Misconduct
Encouraged by high-profile empirical cases from 
Enron to Volkswagen, organization theorists have 
increasingly been looking at the phenomenon of 
organizational misconduct, or the violation of 
laws, norms and rules by organizations (Pozner, 
2008). Within this body of research, many argue 
that organizational misconduct is socially con-
structed (Greve et al., 2010). The line between 
what is right and wrong is blurry and can be 
manipulated by both audiences and perpetrators 
(Palmer, 2012, 2013). A pivotal triggering event 
for the social construction of misconduct is the 
accusation of misconduct, through which behav-
iour is identified as wrongful and is exposed to 
audience scrutiny.
The social construction of misconduct after 
an accusation is the result of an interaction 
between organizations and audiences (Clemente 
& Gabbioneta, 2017). This interaction relies on 
a range of discursive practices (MacLean, 
2008). Discourses are central to this process of 
social construction because, as mentioned, we 
assume that morality is itself discursively con-
structed (Shadnam & Lawrence, 2011), as is 
responsibility (Crocker et al., 1991; Jacquart & 
Antonakis, 2015). However, most of the 
research on the social construction of miscon-
duct has focused on the role of external audi-
ences rather than on the discourses produced by 
the accused organization itself (Clemente & 
Gabbioneta, 2017; Dewan & Jensen, 2019; 
Roulet, 2019). We therefore have limited 
knowledge of how accused organizations and 
their members discursively react to accusations 
of misconduct.
Some indications of this can be found in the 
literature on crisis communication (Bundy, 
Pfarrer, Short, & Coombs, 2017), particularly 
situated crisis communication theory (Coombs 
& Holladay, 2002). Organizations deal with 
accusations of misconduct through crisis com-
munication (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Coombs, 
2007b). When such accusations emerge, audi-
ences often consider the crisis to have been 
avoidable, resulting in significant reputational 
threat for the organization (Coombs & Holladay, 
2006). Because of this threat, the organization 
will engage in discursive strategies, particularly 
scapegoating, to shift the blame (Coombs, 
2007a). Organizational members also suffer 
adverse outcomes (Pozner & Harris, 2016) when 
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they are associated with misbehaving organiza-
tions (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Therefore, organ-
izations and their members will attempt to avoid 
and deflect blame to avoid incurring social pen-
alties. However, the literatures on crisis commu-
nication and organizational misconduct have 
both ignored the discursive strategies of organi-
zational members and how they interact with 
organizational strategies to shift blame. When 
organizations are accused of misconduct, crises 
can trigger blaming processes between organiza-
tional members (Gephart, 1993). We build on the 
crisis communication literature (Coombs, 2007a, 
2007b) to develop a discursive perspective of 
organizational misconduct which can integrate 
the discursive reactions of both organizations 
and their members.
Because adverse outcomes trigger mecha-
nisms of causal search (Weiner, 1986; Wong & 
Weiner, 1981), crisis communication theorists 
argue that, in the aftermath of misconduct, 
organizations will try to shift responsibility to 
avoid reputational penalties (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2002). Major crises tend to generate 
sensemaking processes (Bail, 2015; Boudes & 
Laroche, 2009). Under such conditions, there 
may be a need to attribute blame for misconduct 
to find a satisfactory explanation for it and to 
hold actors responsible (Bucher, 1957), particu-
larly as it is almost impossible for organizations 
to avoid being held responsible because mis-
conduct is by nature deliberate (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2002). Consequently, crises due to 
misconduct are commonly managed by com-
municating and producing discourses to attrib-
ute responsibility (Coombs, 2007a). The 
purpose of these discursive reactions is defence 
(Ashforth & Lee, 1990). We next define the 
conceptual pillars of our discursive perspective 
of organizational misconduct.
The emergence of a discursive space 
to make sense of an accusation of 
misconduct
We anchor our model in the view that audiences 
actively make sense of their social context 
(Radoynovska & King, 2019) where this sense-
making is prompted by the disruptive and sur-
prising event of an accusation of misconduct. 
The audiences that engage in sensemaking fol-
lowing an accusation can be damaged parties, 
customers or suppliers, governments, regula-
tors, the media or simply the general public 
(Clemente, Durand & Porac, 2016; Palmer, 
2013). Some of these audiences are likely to be 
more invested than others in trying to attribute 
responsibility for the misconduct and thus are 
more active in their sensemaking, especially 
those with a higher stake in the accusation of 
misconduct (e.g. if they were harmed by the 
misconduct or have ties to the accused organi-
zation, etc.) (Palmer, 2012). Other audiences 
are motivated to make sense of organizational 
misconduct simply ‘to uphold [their] moral 
standards’ (Barnett, 2014, p. 69).
Following an accusation of misconduct, 
audiences and accused actors are therefore 
likely to engage in a struggle over the interpre-
tation of the misconduct, a struggle which arises 
from the ambiguity inherent in the context of 
organizational misconduct. These discursive 
efforts take place in a dedicated discursive 
space (Grant & Hardy, 2004). The struggle 
unfolds through the generation of discourse 
(Livesey, 2001), i.e. through the audiences 
involved and the actors accused ‘producing, 
distributing, and consuming texts’ (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2012, p. 234) related to the accusation, 
the alleged involvement of accused actors in the 
misconduct, and the nature of the misconduct 
itself. A discursive perspective acknowledges 
the importance of text and language in the 
social construction of organizational phenom-
ena, such that ‘language [is] constitutive and 
constructive of reality’ (Hardy, Lawrence, & 
Grant, 2005; Phillips & Oswick, 2012, p. 445). 
The discourse generated by audiences and the 
accused actors thus shapes the meaning of the 
misconduct. It is ‘embodied in sets of texts that 
come in a wide variety of forms, including writ-
ten documents, speech acts, pictures, and sym-
bols’ (Hardy et al., 2005, p. 59). The texts that 
are produced within the discursive space com-
prise internal and external communications 
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(Frandsen & Johansen, 2011), including press 
releases and official statements by spokesper-
sons, as well as interviews, news articles and 
investigation reports (Coombs, 2007b).
The struggle for meaning in the discursive 
space naturally revolves around a set of critical 
questions: what really happened, how bad was it, 
and who was responsible for it? (Livesey, 2001). 
Those questions are subject to significant discur-
sive struggle. Given the possibility of alternative 
and competing accounts of the same event, 
‘[conduct] is not, of course, intrinsically or auto-
matically to be regarded as a violation, a trans-
gression, or as reprehensible: It is constituted as 
such [. . .] through accounts of conduct and thus 
in a general way through discourse’ (Drew 1998, 
p. 312). In this discursive struggle around mis-
conduct (Livesey, 2001), audiences and accused 
actors take ‘discursive positions’ (Hardy & 
Phillips, 1999): they are discursively related to 
the accusation event through their own and oth-
ers’ discourse, for example, as a ‘victim’ or a 
‘perpetrator’ of misconduct.
Discursive positions as part of the 
blame game
As we have pointed out, in a crisis situation, 
actors will attempt to shift the blame to another 
actor to avoid being held responsible themselves 
(Coombs, 2007b), particularly by generating dis-
courses (Grant, Keenoy, & Oswick, 2001). Such 
discursive positions can be taken both by organi-
zations and their members. When organizations 
hold some of their own members responsible, 
attributions can be cascaded from one set of 
actors to another (Bonardi & Keim, 2005). 
Discourses produced in the aftermath of a crisis 
thus often attribute responsibility to members of 
the organization itself (Coombs, 2007a). For 
example, in the case of the Volkswagen emission 
scandal, the interviews given by top executives 
(which constitute discourses) often involved 
shifting the blame to lower-level employees. In 
response, organizational members may engage 
in ‘dissenting discourses’, deviating at the indi-
vidual level from organizational communication 
(Teo & Caspersz, 2011).
Misconduct can be interpreted and assigned 
meaning in different ways (MacLean, 2008). 
Consequently, in the discursive struggle follow-
ing an accusation of misconduct (Livesey, 2001), 
accused actors will try to take discursive posi-
tions (Hardy & Phillips, 1999) to deflect blame. 
Actors suspected of misconduct can shift the dis-
courses by ‘reorganizing existing information 
and conventions associated with the prior 
schema’ (Werner & Cornelissen, 2014, p. 1456). 
In other words, they can attempt to assign new 
meaning to the information given to audiences 
about the organizational misdeed to reduce or 
escape blame. In this way, actors can attempt to 
manipulate their discursive position through the 
strategic use of discourse. For example, a sus-
pected organization or its members may 
acknowledge the evidence of misconduct identi-
fied by audiences but attribute the responsibility 
to another actor. Reusing existing elements of 
established discourses gives credibility to their 
blame game discourses (Hearit, 1995).
This strategic production of discourse 
involves actors drawing on established dis-
courses to frame the misconduct and their own 
role in it in a certain way (Cornelissen & 
Werner, 2014). As actors frame the organiza-
tional misconduct in different ways, their dis-
cursive strategy can be a reaction to existing 
frames (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). In other 
words, actors generate discourses as a function 
of existing discursive dynamics to position 
themselves in a way that gives credibility to 
their perspective (Lawrence, Phillips, & Hardy, 
1999). In the case of misconduct, suspected 
organizations and their members will generate 
discourses that have a degree of compatibility 
and credibility with existing discourses, and are 
often cast as a reaction to those discourses.
How ambiguity creates opportunities 
for blame games in the aftermath of 
misconduct
Evaluations of accusations of misconduct are 
highly ambiguous because wrongdoing is socially 
constructed (Greve et al., 2010). Ambiguity refers 
to a state where audiences struggle to establish 
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meaningful links between events and objects in a 
social situation, and thus are unable to define the 
situation (Ball-Rokeach, 1973). Ambiguity is 
therefore the quality of a situation being open to 
more than one interpretation (Sennet, 2016). In 
the context of accusations of misconduct and the 
resulting discursive struggle, we consider two 
types of ambiguity: attributional ambiguity 
(Crocker et al., 1991; Jacquart & Antonakis, 
2015), and moral ambiguity (Shadnam & 
Lawrence, 2011).
When attributing an outcome to a cause, 
audiences may struggle to establish causal attri-
bution (Powell, Lovallo, & Caringal, 2006) and 
responsibility for misconduct cannot always be 
clearly attributed to the organization or to indi-
vidual members. In complex organizations 
involving intricate processes, multiple actors 
may be at fault and may not all be fully aware of 
the consequences of their actions (Dahlin, 
Chuang, & Roulet, 2018). This creates attribu-
tional ambiguity (Jacquart & Antonakis, 2015), 
that is, there are multiple ways of attributing 
responsibility for misconduct to actors follow-
ing an accusation of misconduct. The case of 
the Volkswagen emission scandal shows how 
complex it can be for audiences to identify who 
is responsible (Rhodes, 2016). The ambiguity 
of the situation created the conditions for a 
blame game where, for example, before the 
American House Committee for Energy and 
Commerce, the US CEO Michael Horn accused 
software engineers of being solely responsible 
for the misconduct.
The second type of ambiguity stems from 
the socially constructed nature of the line 
between right and wrong which demarcates 
misconduct (Greve et al., 2010); audiences 
contribute to and struggle over defining what 
is right and wrong. While moral norms help 
to determine whether an organizational 
behaviour can be considered as misconduct 
(Roulet, 2019, 2020), these norms vary over 
time and between contexts (Palmer, 2012). At 
the same time, there are differences in per-
spective and in the interpretation of norms 
(Shadnam & Lawrence, 2011). As a result, 
accusations of misconduct are associated 
with moral ambiguity (see also Green, 2004), 
i.e. there are multiple ways of interpreting the 
morality of the behaviour that an accusation 
of misconduct points out. Green (2004) 
examines cases of morally ambiguous organi-
zational misconduct and argues that there is 
moral ambiguity when audiences disagree 
about whether an action is morally wrong or 
not and are ready to debate this stance. The 
debate around working conditions in Amazon 
warehouses in the United Kingdom is a typi-
cal case that demonstrates the difficulty audi-
ences can have in morally evaluating 
behaviour called out in an accusation. In this 
case, audiences disagree about whether 
Amazon is acting in a morally condemnable 
manner or is just putting a high level of pres-
sure on its employees to run an efficient oper-
ation. Amazon denies any misconduct, stating 
that they ‘are proud of our safety record and 
thousands of Amazonians work hard every 
day innovating’.1
The range of moral ambiguity exemplified by 
these two cases – a relatively unambiguous fraud 
in the Volkswagen case and a more ambiguous 
accusation of a harmful working environment in 
the case of Amazon – illustrates the broad range 
of accusations of misconduct that are within the 
scope of our theorizing. We base our theorizing 
on the established definition of misconduct in the 
literature (Greve et al., 2010) and thus theorize 
about all instances where an organization is 
accused of transgressing the line between right 
and wrong (Palmer, 2012). In the most basic 
sense, this transgression is a behaviour that is 
attributable to an actor and is perceived by audi-
ences as morally violating norms. The nature of 
the potential transgression – the specific norm 
violated and how it was supposedly violated – 
along with the information available to audi-
ences at the time of the accusation will lead to 
variation in the levels of moral and attributional 
ambiguity associated with different accusations 
of misconduct. These varying levels of ambigu-
ity surrounding accusations of organizational 
misconduct create an opportunity for actors to 
construct attributions discursively (Clemente & 
Gabbioneta, 2017).
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Discursive Strategies 
Constituting Blame Games
Following an accusation of misconduct, moral 
and attributional ambiguity characterize the situ-
ation in a way that leads to the use of blame 
games. The word ‘games’ is used as a metaphor 
(Cornelissen, 2005) to signal the agency that 
accused individual and organizational actors 
have to discursively maneuvre a situation of 
proven or alleged organizational misconduct. We 
assume that those actors instrumentally adopt 
discursive positions in this context (Butler et al., 
2020) and that they do so by assessing elements 
of the social context, in particular ambiguity, that 
might make those positions credible.
We therefore expect that actors adapt their 
choice of discursive strategy depending on the 
moral and attributional ambiguity that is availa-
ble in the discursive space following the accusa-
tion of misconduct. Within this space, accused 
actors can produce discourses that may deviate 
from the reality of facts and take liberty with the 
truth. This deviation is made possible by moral 
and attributional ambiguity. Some accusations 
are more ambiguous than others. Actors attempt 
to adjust to the structure of the discursive space 
by choosing discursive strategies that align with 
and make use of the different levels of moral and 
attributional ambiguity. In other words, ambigu-
ity enables discourse production strategies that 
serve instrumental purposes (Leitch & 
Davenport, 2007). Moral and attributional ambi-
guity create the opportunity in the discursive 
space for actors to produce discourses strategi-
cally and, in this sense, they constitute a key 
determinant of actors’ blame game strategies.
We theorize that actors employ their discur-
sive strategies through the systematic produc-
tion of texts (van Dijk, 2006; Vaara & Tienari, 
2008). The objective is to influence the settle-
ment of a misconduct in their favour and attain 
a discursive position that limits the reputational 
and other penalties that might result from being 
judged responsible for the misconduct (Coombs 
& Holladay, 2006). A discursive strategy con-
sists of a set of texts that actors produce to attain 
certain subject positions for themselves or 
others. Below, we theorize scapegoating and 
whistleblowing as two key discursive strategies 
that an accused organization and its members 
can use to shift blame.
Scapegoating as an organizational 
discursive strategy
Scapegoating is one of the key discursive strate-
gies used by organizations to shift blame fol-
lowing a crisis (Coombs, 2007a). The term 
‘scapegoat’ was commonly popularized by 
French social theorist René Girard (Girard, 
1982), who initially derived the term from the 
work of Burke (1940). The scapegoat mecha-
nism refers to a process of collectively blaming 
an individual actor (Girard, 1982) which is 
inherently discursive in that it relies on the pro-
duction of texts that support the blame-shifting 
effort (Boeker, 1992). Gamson and Scotch 
(1964) were the first in organization studies to 
use the term to explain why baseball team man-
agers get blamed for their teams’ poor athletic 
performance when they have very little respon-
sibility. Scapegoating is employed by groups or 
organizations which shift responsibility to an 
expendable member or members to save them 
from condemnation and to shift blame (Hargie, 
Stapleton, & Tourish, 2010) and in order to face 
up to the ‘demands of opposition groups’ 
(Bonazzi, 1983, p. 4). When baseball team 
managers are scapegoated, the fans end up 
being appeased and can regain hope of future 
success (Gamson & Scotch, 1964). A wide 
range of work also shows that top executives 
and CEOs can be targeted by scapegoating 
(Hargie et al., 2010; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). 
Actors who can easily be discursively associ-
ated with negative events, such as misconduct, 
are good scapegoats for organizations; as CEOs 
oversee the whole organization, their responsi-
bility can easily be discursively established 
(Gangloff, Connelly, & Shook, 2016).
Organizations that use scapegoating in the 
discourses they produce put their integrity at risk 
and distance themselves from blame by identify-
ing one member as being responsible for the 
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situation – the scapegoat (Hargie et al., 2010). 
Building on the work of René Girard (1982), 
Grint (2010, p. 97) notes that scapegoating is 
‘not an unfortunate consequence of individual 
deviance or lack of control’. Instead, it is instru-
mental (Ashforth & Lee, 1990; Bonazzi, 1983) 
in the sense that it is a rational discursive strategy 
employed by groups when the group is at risk of 
being held responsible. Gamson and Scotch 
(1964) explain that scapegoating is a ‘conveni-
ent, anxiety-reducing act’. These scapegoating 
efforts rely on the creation of discourses that 
attribute the blame to identified scapegoats and 
provide supporting arguments.
The aim of scapegoating is to deflect blame 
by appeasing or winning over the audiences in 
which the blame originates (Gangloff et al., 
2016). For an organization, the objective of this 
strategy is to deflect an accusation of misconduct 
by building the belief that it has changed satis-
factorily – or as Gangloff and colleagues put it 
(p. 1617), by showing that the ‘fault for prior 
wrongdoing resided squarely with [the scape-
goat] and did not permeate the rest of the organi-
zation’. Gamson and Scotch (1964) also stress 
the ceremonial nature of scapegoating: the ritual 
has minimal impact on material organizational 
outcomes and the discourses produced are pri-
marily aimed at managing impressions (Bolino, 
Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008). The accused 
organization can engage in the discursive strat-
egy of scapegoating through the production of 
press releases (Gangloff et al., 2016) and the 
framing of the dismissal (Cornelissen & Werner, 
2014). The aim of this discursive framing is to 
‘rationaliz[e]’ the sacrifice (Grint, 2010, p. 97) 
and, more importantly, attribute responsibility 
and avoid blame through ‘dissociation’ in par-
ticular (Hargie et al., 2010, p. 721).
Whistleblowing as an individual 
discursive strategy
Individual members of organizations that are 
suspected of misconduct can also participate in 
the blame game, particularly through whistle-
blowing (Culiberg & Mihelič, 2017), which is a 
well-studied process in organization studies. 
Whistleblowing is a form of ‘dissenting dis-
course’ (Teo & Caspersz, 2011) and involves an 
‘insider [going] public in their criticism of the 
policy and/or conduct of [a] powerful organiza-
tion’ (Perry, 1998, p. 235). Whistleblowers usu-
ally target the organization they belong to, to 
make it accountable for a suspected or proven 
wrongdoing (Near & Miceli, 2016). Lacking 
power and status, whistleblowers rely on exter-
nal relays to trigger change (Near & Miceli, 
1995; Summers-Effler, 2002; Weiskopf & 
Tobias-Miersch, 2016). While ethical and moral 
judgements are often seen as a critical precursor 
of whistleblowing (Chiu, 2003), we focus here 
on situations where the whistleblowing is trig-
gered by strategic motives (Butler et al., 2020; 
Choo et al., 2019). The positive outcomes from 
such an opportunistic move can be an active 
driver and precursor of the act of whistleblow-
ing in the first place (Culiberg & Mihelič, 
2017). Bonazzi (1983), for example, defines 
whistleblowing as the rational strategy of shift-
ing the responsibility to holders of power fol-
lowing an accusation of misconduct. In such a 
context, the whistleblower is not necessarily 
pointing out an illegal or immoral action by the 
collective or willing to change the situation, as 
suggested by the founding literature on whistle-
blowing (Near & Miceli, 1985). Rather, whistle-
blowers are motivated by the wish to avoid any 
potential retaliation for their responsibility for 
poor performance or other adverse events 
(Westin, 1981, pp. 134–6).
Assuming that whistleblowers have strategic 
motives in the context of blame games (Choo 
et al., 2019), then the more they have to gain from 
positively distinguishing themselves from the 
organization in order to limit contamination or 
blame (Moore et al., 2011), the more likely they 
are to blow the whistle. In the specific context of 
a blame game, the goal of whistleblowers is to 
build positive distinctiveness by distancing them-
selves from the organization being accused (Choo 
et al., 2019). Whistleblowing therefore relies on a 
discourse that creates and supports this position. 
This discourse emerges from the production of 
texts – e.g. interviews, guest editorials in newspa-
pers – that draw a distinction between the 
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whistleblower and the organization being blamed. 
These texts cast the whistleblowers as individuals 
who are revealing evidence about the purported 
wrongdoing, thus discursively distancing them-
selves further from that wrongdoing.
Whistleblowing and scapegoating are, in 
some ways, two facets of a similar phenome-
non: whistleblowers scapegoat the organiza-
tion for wrongdoing in which they might have 
been involved (Near & Miceli, 1995). In our 
theoretical model, we therefore view scape-
goating and whistleblowing as archetypal indi-
vidual and organizational discursive strategies 
of blame games.
How Blame Games Unfold in 
the Aftermath of Misconduct
Blame games involve a broad set of actors in 
interaction, each aiming to deflect the blame for 
an accusation of misconduct. Actors’ views con-
front each other in a discursive space where dif-
ferent strategies are adopted to deflect blame. We 
have seen that research has identified several phe-
nomena related to the attribution of responsibil-
ity, such as whistleblowing (Culiberg & Mihelič, 
2017; Near & Miceli, 1985, 2016; Perry, 1998) 
and scapegoating (Boeker, 1992; Bonazzi, 1983; 
Hargie et al., 2010). As essentially discursive 
struggles, blame games can expose opposite posi-
tions with regard to the attribution of responsibil-
ity (Hargie et al., 2010). Having identified the 
organizational and individual strategies for shift-
ing responsibility that can be used in blame 
games, we now explore when they are used and 
how they can be concomitant and emerge sequen-
tially, depending on the conditions of ambiguity. 
We integrate the concepts of whistleblowing and 
scapegoating to theorize different ideal-type 
pathways through which blame games unfold as 
a function of moral and attributional ambiguity 
and in doing so conceptualize the starting and 
endpoints of those pathways.
The starting point of blame games
Before theorizing these blame game pathways, 
we must first define the conditions that lead 
blame games to unfold in the first place. 
Organizational misconduct can remain uni-
dentified and invisible for a long period 
(Palmer, 2013; Pozner, 2008). It may take 
place but go unnoticed and unreported until 
stakeholders first spot it and take action (Greve 
et al., 2010). For audiences to put pressure on 
an organization suspected of misconduct, the 
situation needs to be brought to their attention 
by constituents or the media through an accu-
sation of misconduct (Faulkner, 2011; Greve 
et al., 2010). Accusations of misconduct can 
be triggered by different external stakeholders, 
including the media, governments and con-
sumers (Barnett, 2014). Whatever the source, 
evidence of an adverse outcome needs to be 
visible and salient to potential accusers – con-
sequently forcing them to make a negative 
causal attribution (Coombs, 2007a). An accu-
sation of misconduct ‘is a publicly expressed 
and perspicuous statement of alleged wrong-
doing’ through which ‘the finger of blame is 
pointed at the culprit’ (Faulkner, 2011, p. 7). 
An accusation is characterized by its ‘in-
betweenness’, i.e. the fact that it goes beyond 
informal grievance in its public and accusatory 
nature but falls short of a formal charge of 
wrongdoing by the state (Faulkner, 2011). It is 
thus inherently ambiguous. For example, audi-
ences start to make sense of organizational 
misconduct following the occurrence of seem-
ingly anecdotal events (Boudes & Laroche, 
2009), those anecdotal events serving as accu-
mulating clues that a misconduct might have 
happened. Crises, more generally, also begin 
when audiences start to attribute responsibility 
for an adverse event (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015), 
meaning that an accusation of misconduct may 
emerge when there is only suspicion of organi-
zational misconduct. Organizations are con-
sidered to have agentic power which makes 
them more likely to be seen as villains rather 
than eliciting sympathy (Rai & Diermeier, 
2015). Accusers usually have an interest in 
pointing their finger at an organization for 
misbehaving (Barnett, 2014), for example, 
when the suspected organization directly 
impacts their activity.
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An accusation of misconduct by external 
stakeholders is thus the starting point for the 
triggering of blame games in our model. We 
conceptualize the accusation as a type of dis-
course in it is own right which opens the discur-
sive space for accused actors to challenge this 
accusation. The aim of such accusation dis-
courses is to allocate an actor to the discursive 
position of a perpetrator of wrongdoing. As 
such, the accusation is:
an event expressed through catchphrases and 
keywords [which] chronicle, capture, and classify 
‘signature elements’, framing and promoting 
definitions of ‘what happened’, ‘who was 
involved’, and ‘what went wrong’, shaping the 
story and providing a theme. It is a symbolic 
packaging [. . .], a virtuoso exercise in the 
‘redescription of behavior in order to transform 
its moral significance’. (Faulkner, 2011, p. 16)
The accusation bears the seeds of the blame 
game. The discursive space that has been opened 
by this accusation is structured by attributional 
(Crocker et al., 1991) and moral ambiguity 
(Shadnam & Lawrence, 2011). After an accusa-
tion, attributional ambiguity emerges when the 
suspected organizational misconduct cannot be 
directly and clearly attributed to the organiza-
tion (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Moral ambi-
guity materializes when audiences struggle to 
evaluate whether an organizational behaviour 
can be clearly categorized as right or wrong 
(Greve et al., 2010; Shadnam & Lawrence, 
2011). Transgressions can be judged to be mor-
ally ambiguous when they appear excusable, or 
borderline, from a normative point of view (Lee 
& Gailey, 2007). Moral ambiguity enables ‘the 
construction of vocabularies of evasion – ways 
to say that the rules do not apply or do not apply 
to you’ (Reichman, 1993, p. 82). Ambiguity can 
trigger a ‘short-circuited logic’ – cognitive 
shortcuts that lead audiences to precipitate 
causal attribution (Smelser, 1963). Most accusa-
tions of organizational misconduct are ambigu-
ous, meaning that the guilt of the organization 
and its members is uncertain and unclear for 
some time (Greve et al., 2010).
The endpoint of blame games
Although we have defined the ingredients for 
the blame game to take place – an accusation of 
misconduct and the resulting ambiguity – we 
have not discussed the pathways involved and 
possible endpoints. In the pathways that we 
theorize below, we explain how the beginning 
and the continuation of the blame game depend 
on the level of existing ambiguity. Indeed, as 
we will see, the discursive positions taken by 
suspected organizations and their members are 
not only affected by but also affect the ensuing 
ambiguity. We specifically assume that, as the 
discursive struggle over misconduct unfolds 
and accused actors take discursive positions to 
prevent blame, ambiguity will decrease in the 
longer term.
We understand ambiguity in the discursive 
struggle to exist from the point of view of audi-
ences. Ambiguity arises following an accusation 
of misconduct because audiences find it difficult 
to make sense of the misconduct (Clemente & 
Gabbioneta, 2017). The ambiguity decreases as 
audiences make sense of the accusation, influ-
enced by their consumption of the discourse 
produced by accused actors. Because ambiguity 
‘arises as an information problem’ and is caused 
by a lack of information (Ball-Rokeach 1973, p. 
379), by definition, any new information will 
help to reduce the ambiguity (Green, 2004; Lee 
& Gailey, 2007; Leitch & Davenport, 2007). To 
interpret blame game discourses, audiences take 
account of the information they obtain about the 
misconduct itself and the positions that actors 
attempt to take in relation to the misconduct 
with their discourses. In the short run, ambiguity 
may increase as a result of the blame game, as 
audiences have to interpret the information pro-
vided by the discursive strategies of the accused 
actors. However, as time goes by, we expect 
audiences to gradually reduce such ambiguity 
for two reasons.
First, with each discursive move that the 
accused actors make, they introduce more infor-
mation about the misconduct that audiences will 
use as part of their sensemaking process (Green, 
2004). For example, the discursive strategies of 
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scapegoating and whistleblowing will provide 
the audiences with additional information 
(Johansen et al., 2012). This information will 
help them to make sense of the moral status of a 
behaviour (thus reducing the moral ambiguity) 
and to attribute responsibility to actors (thus 
reducing attributional ambiguity). Second, the 
longer the blame game goes on, the more 
urgently audiences will wish to make sense of 
the misconduct and settle on an interpretation 
that resolves the ambiguity (Ball-Rokeach, 
1973). Audiences’ sensemaking will be driven 
by ‘plausibility rather than accuracy’ and by the 
need to process the accusation of misconduct in 
a way that enables them to move on and take 
action in response (Weick, 1995, p. 55). 
Therefore, even if the available information is 
not sufficient for reaching factual certainty, 
audiences will eventually settle on interpreta-
tions of the misconduct that are plausible, and 
this becomes increasingly likely the longer 
blame game goes on. Whether the plausible 
interpretation that audiences settle on at the end 
of the blame game is factually correct lies out-
side the scope of our blame game theory: it is 
likely that the strategic discourse of accused 
actors will sometimes be effective in influencing 
audiences’ sensemaking to a significant extent, 
leading to plausible interpretations that in some 
instances do not match the reality of the facts.
Overall, as the blame game unfolds, attribu-
tional and moral ambiguity gradually decline 
(Green, 2004) and the discursive space for 
accused actors shrinks. As there is less ambigu-
ity for the accused actors to exploit (Reichman, 
1993), they are prevented from taking discur-
sive positions to depict their role in the sus-
pected misconduct in a favourable way. Accused 
actors will realize that there is little for them to 
gain if they continue with the blame game and 
attempt to avoid taking responsibility. They are 
therefore less likely to use these discursive 
strategies. We thus start by formulating the fol-
lowing proposition about the end point of the 
blame game.
Proposition 1: The blame game continues 
until ambiguity is too limited for accused 
actors to discursively challenge an accusa-
tion of misconduct.
Blame game pathways
Following an accusation of misconduct, moral 
and attributional ambiguity are not necessarily 
present to the same extent. For example, 
although a behaviour can be judged as morally 
wrong with relative certainty (low moral ambi-
guity) (Green, 2004), it can be hard to attribute 
responsibility for this behaviour to a specific 
actor (high attributional ambiguity). Dutton, 
Dukerich and Harquail (1994) cite the example 
of the lack of support provided to the homeless 
by the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey. While not helping individuals in need 
can clearly be considered wrong, audiences 
were unclear about whether the Port Authority 
was responsible for the situation in the first 
place. On the other hand, although audiences 
might struggle to establish the moral status of a 
behaviour (high moral ambiguity), they may 
easily be able to identify and point to whoever 
is responsible (low attributional ambiguity). In 
the context of the financial crisis, investment 
bankers were found to engage in behaviours 
such as excessive bonuses, extreme risk-taking 
or lobbying, and, while major banks were 
clearly identified as the actors responsible for 
these behaviours, it was unclear whether their 
practices were morally wrong. From the per-
spective of investment bankers, those practices 
were aligned with the norm of their field, while 
from the perspective of the broader society, 
they were seen as misconduct (Roulet, 2019, 
2020). This contradiction was due to a clash 
between institutional prescriptions at the indus-
try level, and broader norms (Roulet, 2015).
By additionally considering situations where 
moral and attributional ambiguity are either both 
high or both low following an accusation of mis-
conduct, we can thus theorize four starting points 
from which blame games unfold into four ideal-
type pathways. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the four starting points, each of which typically 
triggers a different first move in the blame game, 
and leads in turn to a different pathway.
Roulet and Pichler 13
Figure 1 details the different pathways we 
theorize below. It identifies the different condi-
tions of ambiguity that cause a blame game to 
emerge and how the blame game unfolds as a 
consequence. It elaborates on the processes 
through which accusations of misconduct can 
be settled: as ambiguity decreases, the discur-
sive space that is available for actors to engage 
in the blame games shrinks. The blame game 
itself, by providing information that supports 
audiences’ sensemaking of the accusation of 
misconduct, may contribute to reducing ambi-
guity. But as previously noted, it may also con-
tinue for as long as audiences are unable to 
evaluate whether the misconduct is morally 
wrong and who is responsible for it.
Pathway A: Blame game in a situation 
of high moral ambiguity and low 
attributional ambiguity
The first pathway we theorize starts when the 
discursive space, following an accusation of mis-
conduct, is structured by high moral ambiguity 
and low attributional ambiguity. This situation is 
characterized by the difficulty audiences have in 
establishing whether the targeted action is mor-
ally wrong (Green, 2004) although there is a vis-
ible organizational culprit. In such a situation, 
the accusation of misconduct can best be chal-
lenged by the accused organization on normative 
grounds. The low level of attributional ambigu-
ity is not conducive to engaging in discursive 
strategies that attempt to shift blame away from 
the accused actor (Leitch & Davenport, 2007). 
Such strategies will be ineffective because the 
accuser has been clearly identified and linked to 
the misbehaviour in the accusing discourses. 
This could even direct audience attention to the 
fact that there is relatively little doubt about who 
the culprit is, meaning that the route of discur-
sively exploiting attributional ambiguity is 
closed off to the accused actor.
Assessing the available discursive strategies, 
the accused actor is therefore likely to discount 
strategies that focus on manipulating conditions 
of attributional ambiguity. Instead, we might 
expect the accused actor to create discourses 
that exploit the relatively high level of moral 
ambiguity. The most promising discursive strat-
egy will therefore be to counter the accusation 
by denying that the called-out behaviour was 
wrongful in the first place. The accused actors, 
we argue, will produce and formulate argu-
ments denying that the identified behaviour is 
morally condemnable.
The discursive strategy of denying wrong-
fulness consists of producing texts which situ-
ate the behaviour in question away from the line 
that separates right and wrong, attempting to 
draw a clear distinction between that behaviour 
and truly wrongful behaviours. This strategy 
might involve emphasizing the legality, the 
prevalence and the normalcy of the behaviour 
in the wider institutional context (Pozner, 
2008), as well as explaining the benefits of the 
behaviour and promising to address some of its 
Table 1. Configurations of the Discursive Space after an Accusation of Organizational Misconduct.




•• The action identified is broadly 
recognized as morally wrong
•• There is no consensus on who is 
responsible for the action identified
Pathway C
•• There is no consensus around the 
moral nature of the action identified
•• There is no consensus on who is 




•• The action identified is broadly 
recognized as morally wrong
•• The party responsible for the action 
identified is clearly singled out
Pathway A
•• There is no consensus around the 
moral nature of the action identified
•• The party responsible for the action 
identified is clearly singled out
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drawbacks (Roulet, 2019, 2020). The discursive 
position taken here thus relegates the issue of 
responsibility to the background, blurring the 
relationship between the accused actor and the 
potential misconduct. This discursive strategy 
has the function of making full use of the exist-
ing moral ambiguity and avoiding getting 
caught up in the attribution of responsibility 
which, due to the low level of attributional 
ambiguity, provides the accused actors with 
relatively little discursive leeway. We can there-
fore formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 2: When moral ambiguity is high 
and attributional ambiguity is low following 
an accusation of misconduct, the accused 
organization is likely to deny the wrongful-
ness of the behaviour in question.
We previously discussed how many of the 
practices in the investment banking industry 
were not seen as morally wrong by field-level 
actors although they were condemned by the 
media (Roulet, 2019). Banks justified large 
bonuses and risk-taking by showing that those 
practices were common in the industry and 
important for recruiting the best and the bright-
est. They also stressed how their practices con-
formed with the law. In 2010, Goldman Sachs 
and one of its employees were accused of securi-
ties fraud because the firm had designed a prod-
uct, called Abacus, which was considered to 
mislead investors. However, although it settled 
in court, Goldman Sachs always denied wrong-
doing, taking advantage of the moral gray zone 
with regards to investor and client relationships.
In this first scenario, we can identify two pos-
sible next steps. Following proposition 1, we 
might expect ambiguity to decrease as audiences 
accept the suspected actor’s arguments that the 
identified behaviour was not morally wrong 
(Green, 2004). In this case, the discursive 
response of denying wrongfulness will be effec-
tive in discarding the accusation by reducing 
moral ambiguity. The ambiguity will be settled, 
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Figure 1. Summary of the Theoretical Model: Pathways of Blame Games.
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fail to be convinced of the wrongfulness of the 
action. The other possibility is that the accused 
actor’s discursive positioning will not convince 
the audiences (Leitch & Davenport, 2007). 
Accusers might further refine their arguments 
and reinforce their discursive position to counter 
the denial of the accused organization. For exam-
ple, the accusers’ discourses might re-emphasize 
and reinforce the wrongfulness of the behaviour, 
e.g. by highlighting distinctions between the law 
and morality or by calling out the harm that the 
behaviour has caused. If sufficient moral ambi-
guity remains at this point, the accused organiza-
tion could, in turn, again deny wrongfulness. 
This discursive struggle will continue as moral 
ambiguity remains sufficiently high, unless audi-
ences settle in between on an interpretation of the 
behaviour as wrongful or not wrongful.
Pathway B: Blame game in a situation 
of low moral ambiguity and high 
attributional ambiguity
In this second pathway, we theorize what hap-
pens after an accusation of misconduct when 
moral ambiguity is low (the behaviour identified 
by the accuser is perceived as morally wrong) 
and attributional ambiguity is high (audiences 
are unclear about who is responsible for the 
wrongdoing). In this context, accused actors 
have the opportunity to engage in discursive 
strategies that shift and deflect blame, taking 
advantage of the difficulty audiences have in 
attributing responsibility.
The low level of moral ambiguity in this sit-
uation means that discursive strategies which 
exploit moral ambiguity are unlikely to be 
effective, as there is already a relatively strong 
consensus among audiences that the accused 
organization’s behaviour transgresses the line 
between right and wrong (Palmer, 2012). 
Denying the wrongfulness of the behaviour in 
this situation could even backfire and exacer-
bate negative audience evaluations by making 
the accused actor appear indifferent to conven-
tional moral standards. Therefore, the discur-
sive exploitation of moral ambiguity is 
impossible in this situation. Instead, the situa-
tion is conducive to exploiting the relatively 
high level of attributional ambiguity that char-
acterizes the discursive space. To deflect blame, 
accused actors will therefore opt for discursive 
strategies that rely on attributional ambiguity, 
producing discourses that deny their responsi-
bility and assign the position of being the perpe-
trator or chief architect of the misconduct to 
someone else.
Based on previous work on crisis manage-
ment (Coombs, 2007a), we define scapegoating 
as a critical organizational discursive strategy 
for shifting blame following an accusation of 
misconduct with low moral but high attribu-
tional ambiguity.2 In this situation, a clear 
wrongdoing is made visible but it is still unclear 
which actors exactly are responsible. This may 
then trigger efforts by audiences to identify the 
cause and the source of the organizational 
wrongdoing, bearing the risk that the finger of 
blame is pointed at the organization as a whole 
(Bonazzi, 1983; Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & 
Belsito, 2009). This vulnerability triggers a dis-
cursive reaction from the organization (Girard, 
1982). The accused organization will attempt to 
discursively shift blame, for which the high 
level of attributional ambiguity provides the 
necessary discursive opportunity. To do so, the 
organization will generate discourses that blame 
individual organizational members in order to 
shift the blame away from the organization. 
Individual employees with limited retaliatory 
power, especially at lower levels of the organi-
zation, can become easy targets for this scape-
goating (Djabi & de Longueval, 2020). But 
high-level executives and even CEOs can also 
become the target of scapegoating discourses, 
mainly because they are the most visible to out-
siders and naturally seem to hold most of the 
responsibility (Gangloff et al., 2016), which 
makes it easier for audiences to associate them 
with the misconduct. Thus, we formulate the 
following proposition:
Proposition 3a: When moral ambiguity is 
low and attributional ambiguity is high fol-
lowing an accusation of misconduct, the 
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accused organization is likely to engage in 
scapegoating.
The discursive strategy of scapegoating relies 
on creating a distinction between the accused 
organization as a whole and some of its mem-
bers. The discourse produced attributes respon-
sibility for the misconduct to specific individual 
members, thus distancing the organization from 
the accusation. Going back to the case of the 
Volkswagen emissions scandal, the relatively 
high attributional ambiguity surrounding the 
allegation of fraudulent behaviour enabled 
Volkswagen to scapegoat software engineers as 
‘rogue coders’.3 Because it was hard for external 
audiences to understand the chain of command, 
the targeted organization was able to use that 
attributional ambiguity to its advantage to 
deflect blame through scapegoating.
While scapegoating is a top-down process 
for shifting blame from the organization to indi-
vidual members, we can also expect a similar 
bottom-up effort by organizational members to 
shift blame to the organization (Frandsen & 
Johansen, 2011). Indeed, individual organiza-
tional members can be in an advantageous posi-
tion to exploit attributional ambiguity and to 
generate their own discourses attributing 
responsibility for misconduct to the organiza-
tion. Information about organizational miscon-
duct will be available within the organization, 
and the discursive struggle that follows the 
accusation of misconduct can involve individ-
ual employees introducing this information into 
the discourse and making it available to outside 
audiences. Organizational members may have 
direct information and witness the wrongdoing 
(Frandsen & Johansen, 2011) and they are thus 
in a better position to suggest causal attributions 
of misconduct.
As previously stressed, whistleblowing is an 
individual discursive strategy that can shift 
blame away from the individual. Through 
whistleblowing, members within the accused 
organization who are at risk of being blamed can 
position themselves in the discursive space. They 
can produce arguments that will exonerate them 
of responsibility and shift the blame to the 
organization instead, taking advantage of the 
high level of attributional ambiguity. Therefore, 
following an accusation of misconduct which 
might result in scapegoating attempts by the 
organization, organizational members may pre-
empt such a move by whistleblowing. 
Whistleblowing involves organizational mem-
bers producing text that shifts the responsibility 
to the organization as a whole and offers infor-
mation which is only available to insiders and 
which in many instances substantiates this attri-
bution of responsibility (Bonazzi, 1983). This 
discursive strategy enables members to avoid 
being blamed by the organization for their 
responsibility in the wrongdoing (Westin, 1981) 
and to avoid future reputational penalties for 
themselves (Coombs, 2007b). We theorize that 
scapegoating can be pre-empted by members of 
the organization who attempt to produce whistle-
blowing discourses to exonerate themselves and 
shift blame.
Proposition 3b: When moral ambiguity is low 
and attributional ambiguity is high following 
an accusation of misconduct, members of the 
accused organization – particularly those that 
could be held responsible for the misconduct 
– are likely to blow the whistle.
There are many examples where whistle-
blowers who revealed misconduct might have 
been blamed if they had not intervened. In 
2013, Laurence do Rego, the chief executive for 
risk and finance for Ecobank – one of the major 
banking conglomerates in Africa – revealed the 
wrongdoing of the chairman and the incoming 
executive director, pre-empting potential inves-
tigation of the entire company by the Nigeria 
Securities & Exchange Commission. Similarly, 
in 2010, Cheryl Eckard, quality manager at 
pharma giant GlaxoSmithKline, exposed sev-
eral wrongdoings related to the quality of medi-
cines sold by the firm after the Federal Drug 
Agency had issued relevant warnings. Given 
their positions within those firms, both execu-
tives would have been considered responsible 
if the wrongdoing had become visible to 
stakeholders.
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We have identified two potential first moves 
in blame games in situations of high attribu-
tional ambiguity and low moral ambiguity 
which originate from either the organization 
(scapegoating) or its members (whistleblow-
ing). Both of these discursive strategies can 
initiate a blame game in this pathway, as the 
discursive space with high attributional and 
low moral ambiguity is conducive to either 
paths. However, because the discursive space 
for blame games shrinks in the longer term 
(proposition 1), the actor who makes the first 
move has a certain advantage. On the other 
hand, as a strategy, whistleblowing can be very 
costly to individual members; e.g. it may back-
fire or require them to leave the organization. 
Therefore, individual members will only make 
a first move following an accusation of mis-
conduct if they perceive the risk of organiza-
tional scapegoating discourses to be particularly 
high. We do not formally theorize this mecha-
nism but expect it will depend on the nature of 
the misconduct accusation: if this accusation 
initially appears to point relatively more to 
individual than to organizational responsibility, 
organizational members are more likely to fear 
that they will soon be blamed for the potential 
misconduct by their organization through 
scapegoating, and are thus more likely to make 
the first move.
We can expect the discursive strategies of 
scapegoating and whistleblowing to be met by 
discursive reactions that target the discourses 
which started the blame game. Up until now, we 
have conceptualized whistleblowing as a pre-
emptive strategy (proposition 3b): individual 
actors at risk of being blamed by the organiza-
tion pre-empt such scapegoating by blowing the 
whistle (Butler et al., 2020). However, if scape-
goating happens first, whistleblowing will 
become an individual-level discursive reaction 
to scapegoating discourses. Scapegoating dis-
courses are generated by the accused organiza-
tion and aim to shift the blame to the individual. 
However, members of an organization who are 
made scapegoats can engage in whistleblowing 
as a way of producing discourses that respond 
to this blame-shifting: the texts provided by 
whistleblowers who react to scapegoating will 
aim to clarify the link between those whistle-
blowers and the behaviours attributed to them 
through scapegoating (Kenny, 2019). The aim 
of those discourses will be to answer scapegoat-
ing claims and to provide an alternative account 
of who is responsible for the misconduct, e.g. 
by using the insider knowledge of the whistle-
blower to reframe the misconduct as a systemic, 
organizational problem that goes beyond indi-
vidual culpability (Keil, Tiwani, Sainsbury, & 
Sneha, 2010). We thus theorize that, as a 
response to scapegoating, organizational mem-
bers will blow the whistle, shifting the blame 
back to the organization as a whole:
Proposition 4a: In a continued situation of 
low moral and high attributional ambiguity, 
and once they have been targeted by scape-
goating discourses, members of the accused 
organization are likely to blow the whistle to 
deflect blame.
One example of the discursive reaction of a 
scapegoat is that of John Schnatter, founder of 
the American pizza franchise Papa John. He 
had to resign from his position as chairman in 
July 2018 after making a racist remark in a con-
ference call and was scapegoated by the firm’s 
top executives. In the meantime, Schnatter 
pointed out the company’s problematic organi-
zational culture. In an interview in August, 
Schnatter talked about ‘rot at the top’ and 
blamed the company’s problems on the new 
CEO and the ‘vindictive and controlling’ lead-
ership style of the top executives.4 This body of 
discourses illustrates how scapegoated actors 
respond to blame when attribution is difficult. 
In a similar case, Jerome Kerviel, after being 
condemned in the rogue trading affair in 2008, 
started to denounce the culture of his organiza-
tion, Société Générale, as a significant driver of 
misconduct.
Whistleblowing, whether as a pre-emptive 
discursive strategy or as a response to scape-
goating, provides the accusers with more infor-
mation, potentially reducing attributional 
ambiguity by enabling them to home in on the 
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responsible party. Whistleblowing discourses 
thus trigger discursive reactions from the 
accused organization: the organization has to 
address the new information introduced by 
whistleblowing and its implications for the 
attribution of responsibility. The organizational 
discourse in response to whistleblowing will, 
we argue, focus on deflecting the blame, justi-
fying the behaviour of the organization, and 
delegitimizing the discursive position of the 
whistleblower. The discursive reaction of the 
organization is therefore another element of a 
scapegoating strategy which aims to distance 
the organization as a whole from the miscon-
duct by continuing to shift the blame to indi-
vidual members (Djabi & de Longueval, 2020). 
This strategy may rely, for example, on attribut-
ing blame for the misconduct to the whistle-
blower and highlighting it as an isolated 
instance of individual misconduct. Alternatively, 
it may attack the whistleblower on moral 
grounds and leverage another, unrelated accu-
sation of misconduct against the whistleblower 
in order to delegitimize the original whistle-
blowing claim. Such a discursive reaction will 
only be effective for the accused organization if 
the level of attributional ambiguity remains 
high enough, despite the information that came 
to light through the whistleblowing. A continu-
ing high level of attributional ambiguity makes 
it difficult for accusers to clearly identify an 
individual or organizational culprit and, as a 
consequence, audiences will continue to strug-
gle to evaluate the validity of organizational 
and individual discourses.
Proposition 4b: In a situation of continuing 
low moral and high attributional ambiguity, 
after organizational members have blown 
the whistle, the accused organization is 
likely to engage in scapegoating its members 
to deflect blame.
In the 2013 whistleblowing case involving 
Laurence do Rego, Ecobank top executives 
countered the accusation of the whistleblower 
by accusing her of not having the qualifica-
tions she claimed to have and of taking 
revenge on the organization.5 This discursive 
position aimed to deflect the whistleblowing 
claim by delegitimizing its source. However, 
when institutional shareholders and other 
stakeholders started to investigate the matter, 
the bank was forced to fire the controversial 
chief executive and reinstate the whistle-
blower in her post.6
Scapegoating and whistleblowing both 
contribute to furthering the misconduct 
inquiry as the discourses generated provide 
new information. This can increase ambiguity 
in the short run while audiences engage with 
this new information. However, in the long 
run, as the blame game unfolds, we can expect 
this ambiguity to decrease with the emergence 
of new information. Audiences will use this 
new information to form plausible links 
between the misconduct event and accused 
actors, converging on a definition of the situa-
tion that reduces attributional ambiguity 
(Ball-Rokeach, 1973). The public availability 
of this information puts external audiences 
and internal organizational actors on an equal 
footing to make causal attributions. At the 
same time, the scapegoating and whistleblow-
ing discourses generated by the suspected 
organization and its members become less 
credible (Grant et al., 2001): the validity of 
the discourses which attempt to shift blame is 
evaluated as they are checked against emerg-
ing information. We expect the blame games 
in this pathway to die out as the discursive 
space shrinks because of decreasing ambigu-
ity, thereby giving accused actors fewer 
opportunities to adopt discursive blame-shift-
ing strategies through additional whistleblow-
ing or scapegoating moves.
When Volkswagen tried to blame the emis-
sions scandal on ‘rogue’ software engineers, 
political and legal stakeholders questioned this 
accusation. As the scandal unfolded, new infor-
mation emerged, suggesting that top executives 
had also known about and concealed the soft-
ware manipulation.7 The Volkswagen example 
illustrates how blame game discourses lose 
credibility as more information emerges, thereby 
reducing ambiguity.
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Pathway C: Blame game in a situation 
of high moral ambiguity and high 
attributional ambiguity
This third pathway unfolds if both moral and 
attributional ambiguity are high following an 
accusation of misconduct. In this case, the dis-
cursive space appears to offer the broadest range 
of opportunities for the accused actors to deflect 
the blame. But the discursive space, while pre-
senting a variety of strategic opportunities, is 
also uniquely complex. Actors accused of mis-
conduct have two options: they can exploit the 
high moral ambiguity by engaging in a discur-
sive strategy of denying wrongfulness, or they 
can exploit the high attributional ambiguity by 
engaging in discursively shifting blame. 
However, these choices are not independent of 
each other, and actors have to consider their 
interdependency when choosing their first move 
in this particular blame game scenario.
On the one hand, if actors try to exploit attri-
butional ambiguity and engage in blame-shift-
ing by attributing responsibility to another actor 
(through scapegoating or whistleblowing), they 
will forego the option of denying wrongfulness. 
This problem arises because shifting the blame 
for a behaviour to another actor, through scape-
goating or whistleblowing, implicitly acknowl-
edges the wrongfulness of the said behaviour 
(Kent & Boatwright, 2018). If the behaviour 
were not wrongful, it would not be necessary to 
point the finger at another actor. Therefore, the 
discursive exploitation of high attributional 
ambiguity through blame-shifting simultane-
ously reduces the existing moral ambiguity and 
thus restructures the discursive space to pre-
clude subsequent denials of wrongdoing. 
Therefore, if, in this scenario, accused actors 
start a blame game with a whistleblowing or 
scapegoating move, the situation will transition 
into the blame-shifting dynamics of pathway B.
On the other hand, if actors choose to exploit 
moral ambiguity and deny wrongfulness, they 
will leave space for subsequent scapegoating or 
whistleblowing in case the denial of wrongful-
ness is unsuccessful. The rationale for such 
action is that, when denying wrongfulness 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2002), actors push the 
question of responsibility to the background but 
do not necessarily take responsibility for the 
behaviour. Accused actors can deny wrongdo-
ing while keeping attributions of responsibility 
deliberately vague in order to retain discursive 
leeway in the next step of the blame game, 
thereby preserving the strategic option of gen-
erating scapegoating discourses. In the case of 
the Abacus scandal, Goldman Sachs denied the 
wrongfulness of its behaviour as much as it 
could but ultimately opted to make one of its 
vice presidents a scapegoat on the path to set-
tling the situation with the Securities & 
Exchange Commission. Thus, we can conclude 
that, due to the specific interdependency of high 
moral and attributional ambiguity in this par-
ticular situation, the most rational course of 
action is for actors to start the blame game by 
denying wrongfulness, keeping their discursive 
options open further down the line.
Proposition 5: When moral and attributional 
ambiguity are both high following an accu-
sation of misconduct, the accused organiza-
tion is likely to first deny the wrongfulness 
of the behaviour in question.
This denial of wrongfulness will set off a 
discursive struggle about the moral status of the 
behaviour in question, which is eventually 
likely to settle at a low level of moral ambiguity 
with audiences interpreting the behaviour either 
as a misconduct or as a morally acceptable 
behaviour. In the latter case, the denial of 
wrongfulness has been successful, and the 
accusation is neutralized in a similar way to 
pathway A. However, in the former case, the 
behaviour is now clearly seen by audiences as 
misconduct, and the suspected organization still 
faces the accusation. This new situation is char-
acterized by low moral ambiguity but still by 
high attributional ambiguity, leaving some 
room for an attribution of responsibility. 
Therefore, the accused actors have retained the 
option of engaging in blame-shifting discursive 
strategies, and the dynamics of the blame game 
transition into those of pathway B.
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Pathway D: Blame game in a 
situation of low moral ambiguity and 
low attributional ambiguity
The final blame game pathway unfolds in a 
situation where both moral and attributional 
ambiguity are relatively low following an 
accusation of misconduct. Here, the discursive 
space available for a blame game is limited, 
making it short-lived or even unlikely. There is 
not enough ambiguity for the accused actors to 
exploit to generate discourses that can shift 
blame. Therefore, shifting the blame is difficult 
because the accused organization is clearly 
associated with the misconduct (low attribu-
tional ambiguity). Denying the wrongfulness 
of the called-out behaviour also has little 
chance of success (because of the low moral 
ambiguity). Indeed, denying wrongdoing is 
likely to backfire in a context of low attribu-
tional and moral ambiguity as the accused actor 
is already perceived as being responsible 
(Coombs, Frandsen, Holladay, & Johansen, 
2010) and the behaviour clearly appears to be 
wrongful. This discursive strategy will only 
lead to further reputational damage for the 
accused actor (Coombs, 2007a).
In this case, the accused actor is cornered 
by the lack of moral and attributional ambigu-
ity. Here, the most rational discursive strat-
egy, apart from remaining silent and not 
reacting, is to take responsibility for the 
wrongdoing pointed out by the accusers. 
Actors are therefore most likely to generate 
discourses in which they take the blame for 
the situation to minimize damage to their rep-
utation and try to repair it (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2006). That is, they will, for exam-
ple, engage in apology, reduce the extent of 
their responsibility by highlighting extenuat-
ing factors while acknowledging their fault 
(Coombs et al., 2010), and signal their will-
ingness to make amends (Coombs, 2007b).
Proposition 6: When moral and attributional 
ambiguity are low following an accusation 
of misconduct, accused actors are likely to 
take the blame for misconduct in response.
In July 2020, Deutsche Bank’s links with the 
criminal Jeffrey Epstein were exposed and the 
bank was accused of having enabled fraudulent 
transactions despite knowing about Epstein’s 
criminal history. They immediately issued an 
apology, saying that they ‘deeply regret’ their 
association with Epstein.8 Another example of 
this situation is the case of Fuji TV and Sankei 
Shimbun in January 2020 when the two 
Japanese media firms were caught red-handed 
using partly fabricated polls in their pro-
grammes. Although a subcontractor was 
involved, it was clear that the media companies 
were responsible for not carefully checking the 
content being shared and how it was produced. 
The wrongfulness of their action and their 
responsibility in the misconduct were clear and 
offered no discursive opportunities other than 
accepting the blame.
Discussion and Conclusion
In our blame game model, we explored how 
accused organizations and their members pro-
duce strategic discourses as a reaction to accusa-
tions of misconduct, thus attempting to shift 
blame and influence the social construction of 
misconduct. Building on the crisis management 
literature and developing a discursive perspec-
tive of misconduct to integrate whistleblowing 
and scapegoating, we detailed the determinants 
of blame game strategies and their sequential 
nature. In the process, we identified the critical 
role of moral and attributional ambiguity in ena-
bling and animating blame games. We developed 
four blame game scenarios following an accusa-
tion of misconduct, as a function of the levels of 
moral and attributional ambiguity.
In the first scenario (pathway A), we 
explained how a high level of moral ambiguity 
(i.e. the behaviour pointed out cannot be clearly 
labelled as morally wrong by audiences) and a 
low level of attributional ambiguity (i.e. a cul-
prit is clearly identifiable by audiences) is likely 
to trigger efforts by the accused organization to 
create discourses that deny wrongdoing by 
challenging the claim that an action was wrong-
ful (proposition 2). In the second scenario 
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(pathway B), we argued that if audiences are 
unsure of the identity of the culprit, this opens a 
discursive space for suspected actors to deflect 
blame. With moral ambiguity being low (i.e. the 
behaviour pointed out is clearly morally wrong) 
and attributional ambiguity being high (i.e. 
audiences are unsure about who should be held 
responsible), the organization can exploit the 
attributional ambiguity and shift the blame by 
scapegoating some of its members who can be 
associated with the misconduct – from the 
CEOs to lower-level employees (proposition 
3a). We then expect in turn scapegoats to retali-
ate and generate whistleblowing discourses 
aimed at shifting the blame to the organization 
(proposition 4a).
As an alternative first move in this scenario, 
potential whistleblowers can also take advan-
tage of attributional ambiguity to kick off a 
blame game themselves when they anticipate 
that they are likely to be scapegoated in the 
future. The organizational members who 
already fear being blamed for the wrongdoing 
assess whether it is in their interest to positively 
distance themselves from the organization and 
may pre-emptively do so through whistleblow-
ing (proposition 3b). In response to such 
whistleblowing, the organization may then in 
turn engage in further discursive strategies to 
shift the blame once more, scapegoating the 
whistleblowers or other organizational mem-
bers (proposition 4b). This back-and-forth 
movement between organizational and individ-
ual discursive blame game strategies can con-
tinue until moral and attributional ambiguity 
generally decrease and external audiences are 
able to attribute responsibility (proposition 1). 
In other words, yet further moves in the blame 
game become at that point less credible as audi-
ences are able to assess their validity with more 
information at their disposal. In addition, the 
longer blame games go on, the more likely 
audiences are to simply settle for one of the 
more plausible accounts that has been con-
structed through their interactions with the 
accused parties and other stakeholders.
In a third scenario, in which moral and attri-
butional ambiguity are both high (pathway C), 
we suggest that accused actors take advantage 
of high moral ambiguity to deny the wrongful-
ness of the identified behaviour (proposition 5), 
while leaving open the option of engaging in a 
blame game of scapegoating and whistleblow-
ing if that denial does not convince audiences. 
Finally, in pathway D, we conceptualized a situ-
ation in which moral and attributional ambigu-
ity are low, leaving the accused organization 
with no option other than taking the discursive 
position of accepting the blame (proposition 6).
Contributions and implications for 
future research
Our blame game theory contributes to the litera-
ture on organizational misconduct. First, by 
developing a discursive perspective on miscon-
duct accusations, we advance our understand-
ing of the social construction of misconduct. 
Importantly, our discursive approach differs 
from more material approaches to misconduct 
and situations in which problematic behaviours 
are transparently established (Mohliver, 2019), 
thus acknowledging the socially constructed 
nature of wrongdoing (Greve et al., 2010). We 
do not consider instances of misconduct as 
something objectively given, to which stake-
holders react and for which organizations initi-
ate corrective action (Hersel, Helmuth, Zorn, 
Shropshire, & Ridge, 2019; Shymko & Roulet, 
2017). Rather, our discursive perspective con-
ceptualizes misconduct as being constructed 
through a struggle for meaning between audi-
ences and accused actors in a discursive space. 
Here, accused actors strategically produce 
blame game discourses, and audiences actively 
make sense of potential misconduct by consum-
ing and producing discourses.
Second, we shed light on a critical period of 
time in the social construction of misconduct: 
i.e. when audiences are making sense of organi-
zational misconduct following an accusation 
(Dewan & Jensen, 2019). Our theoretical frame-
work unpacks this understudied point in the 
organizational misconduct literature. We argued 
that this period is characterized by potentially 
high levels of moral (Shadnam & Lawrence, 
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2011) and attributional ambiguity (Jacquart & 
Antonakis, 2015), which open a discursive 
space that accused actors can exploit and in 
which audiences struggle to interpret the behav-
iour of accused actors. We thus show how this 
definitional turmoil is particularly well suited to 
studying the social construction of misconduct 
because meanings are in flux, which makes the 
discursive struggle more intense and exposes 
the social construction processes.
Third, we contribute to the literature by devel-
oping our understanding of the strategic behav-
iour of accused actors, and thus of their role in 
the social construction of misconduct. Previous 
work on misconduct has focused primarily on 
the role of external audiences (media, regulators, 
governments) in the social construction of mis-
conduct (Clemente & Gabbioneta, 2017; Greve 
et al., 2010). In contrast, we focus on how 
accused actors themselves feed into the discur-
sive construction of misconduct and blame. In 
particular, we suggest that given the difficulty in 
morally evaluating and attributing responsibility 
for misconduct in complex organizations and 
settings, accused actors will attempt to influence 
audiences’ sensemaking by employing discur-
sive strategies aimed at avoiding blame. Rather 
than focusing on blame games as a sensemaking 
process that generates explanatory content 
(Boudes & Laroche, 2009), we argue that blame 
games potentially disturb the sensemaking pro-
cesses in the aftermath of an accusation of mis-
conduct (Daudigeos, Roulet, & Valiorgue, 2020). 
Our theory highlights the agency that accused 
actors have to actively shape the social construc-
tion of misconduct, thereby revealing the poten-
tial for manipulation by these actors.
Finally, we bridge the gap between the con-
cepts of whistleblowing and scapegoating. 
Whistleblowing and scapegoating have so far 
been studied in separate streams of work in 
crisis communications (Coombs, 2007a; 
Coombs & Holladay, 2006) and in organiza-
tion theory (Culiberg & Mihelič, 2017; Kenny, 
2019; Near & Miceli, 2016). We show how 
those two phenomena are intertwined in con-
texts of organizational wrongdoing and inte-
grate them into the misconduct literature under 
the same conceptual umbrella. Where previ-
ously, the differences in levels of analysis, ini-
tiating actors and a focus on non-instrumental 
motivations (Djabi & de Longueval, 2020; 
Kenny, 2019) may have prevented the integra-
tion of those two literatures, we show how 
those streams of work can be integrated.
Based on our theory, future misconduct 
research could further explore the role of ambi-
guity in the process through which organiza-
tional misconduct is settled. For example, 
scholars could bring in more of the existing 
work on causal attribution (Powell et al., 2006) 
to explore how audiences process strategic dis-
courses by accused actors in making moral 
judgements and attribution of responsibility. 
Furthermore, more detailed examination of the 
content of scapegoating, whistleblowing and 
other strategic blame game discourses could 
enable future research to develop a better 
understanding of how discursive strategies 
depend on the nature of the misconduct and 
audiences. Other aspects could be considered 
to understand how actors decide to engage in 
whistleblowing, as we know from previous 
research that organizational position or power 
are crucial determinants, as is material evi-
dence (Kenny, 2019).
In addition to our contributions to the mis-
conduct research, our blame game theory has 
key implications for the literature on social 
evaluations, particularly negative social evalu-
ations (Pollock, Lashley, Rindova, & Han, 
2019). We theorize how individual and collec-
tive actors can strategically manipulate how 
they are socially evaluated in order to avoid 
being held responsible for misconduct, and the 
presumed cost and benefits associated with 
these strategic manipulations. In this sense, we 
bring together the literatures on social evalua-
tion and misconduct, linking more explicitly 
how evaluation affects the consequences of 
misconduct (Dewan & Jensen, 2019) and, con-
versely, how misconduct affects evaluation 
(Roulet, 2020). Because misconduct is an act 
of deviance – a key precursor of negative social 
evaluation – those two bodies of work can 
complement each other.
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We also enrich our understanding of social 
evaluations by developing a discursive perspec-
tive (Phillips & Oswick, 2012; Werner & 
Cornelissen, 2014). Social evaluations are 
effectively framing devices and there would be 
benefits in further exploring their discursive 
nature (Roulet, 2019; Roulet, Paolella, 
Gabbioneta, & Muzio, 2019; Ruebottom & 
Toubiana, 2020). By examining how actors 
instrumentally act to make other actors illegiti-
mate through scapegoating or whistleblowing, 
we offer a strategic discursive perspective on 
social evaluations (Suchman, 1995). Actors not 
only affect the social evaluations of others in 
the process, they also discursively manipulate 
their own evaluation, for example, when 
whistleblowers distance themselves from a 
blamed organization to avoid harmful contami-
nation (Moore et al., 2011). However, we could 
argue that there is a decreasing marginal return 
in doing so: more actors opting out and adding 
their voice to the public criticism will result in 
any additional whistleblowers standing out less 
from the crowd. Insiders are likely to question 
the behaviour of the whistleblowers and expose 
their true motives. Thus, discursive blame strat-
egies may have decreasing returns as the blame 
game unfolds.
Our theoretical framework also fleshes out 
the processes of attributing social evaluations 
and shows why they cannot be studied in isola-
tion. The processes through which social evalu-
ations are attributed work in ‘cascades’ (Bonardi 
& Keim, 2005): evaluations are successively 
triggered by each other as defensive reactions. 
While most of the research on social evalua-
tions (Pollock et al., 2019) focuses on one level 
of analysis and on a particular point in time. We 
distinguish between collectively and individu-
ally attributed social evaluations in line with the 
emerging literature which links categorization 
and social evaluations (Devers et al., 2009; 
Roulet, 2020) and do so while being attentive to 
changing evaluations over time as well. Future 
research could explore whether judgements of 
status, reputation or legitimacy emerge at dif-
ferent levels and how they can result from col-
lective and individual processes.
Extensions of our theory and practical 
implications
Overall, our theoretical framework is concerned 
with organizational misconduct and clearly 
focuses on blame games at the organizational 
level. However, we believe our model is extend-
able to a more macro level of analysis if we 
consider trickling down and trickling up mech-
anisms (Roulet et al., 2019) and evaluative 
spillovers outside of an incriminated field 
(Aranda, Conti, & Wezel, 2020). In particular, it 
could also be applied to fields or groups of 
organizations that interact in the same institu-
tional arena (Zietsma, Groenewegen, Logue, & 
Hinings, 2017). Thus, we can imagine blame 
games taking place at the field or society level, 
involving a wide range of different agents 
(groups, institutions, communities, organiza-
tions, individuals) (Bettman & Weitz, 1983). In 
the case of the 2008 financial crisis, the entire 
investment banking industry was accused of 
triggering the financial crisis (Roulet, 2019), 
and some actors within this sector shifted the 
blame to the field rather than the organizational 
level. One example is the position taken by 
M&T Bank and its CEO Robert Wilmers, who 
accused the ‘big banks’ of tarnishing the reputa-
tion of the whole industry. During the 2008 cri-
sis, some actors tried to differentiate themselves 
by engaging in what we might call ‘field-level 
whistleblowing’. In this way, we see how blame 
games can target fields and groups of organiza-
tional actors. More generally, accused organiza-
tions or CEOs may blame external actors such 
as law makers or governments, or point out 
their competitors. Future theorization could 
consider an external locus of blame game strat-
egies and how they might interact with blame 
games within organizations.
We also believe that our model could be 
applied to a broader set of contexts in which 
audiences attribute responsibility for failure 
(Dahlin et al., 2018). In cases of major industrial 
accidents (e.g. oil spills, nuclear hazards, build-
ings collapsing, etc.), the major organizational 
players may be accused of negligence or irre-
sponsibility (Moura, Beer, Patelli, & Lewis, 
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2017). In such a case, moral ambiguity is likely 
to be high because it is difficult to assess the 
intentionality of causing a failure or the existence 
of gross negligence (Castro, Phillips, & Ansari, 
2020). Attributional ambiguity will also be high 
because of the complexity of the processes and 
the multiplicity of actors involved in industrial 
operations (Dahlin et al., 2018; Palmer, 2012: 
chapter10). Such a situation is therefore likely 
characterized by a discursive space similar to the 
one we described in pathway C and may be fer-
tile ground for blame games to unfold.
Our theory could be further extended by 
empirically exploring the blame game process 
and answering the research questions that 
emerge from our model. We can imagine situa-
tions in which the blame game does not reduce 
ambiguity if audiences are unable to assess the 
validity of new information brought to their 
scrutiny. In such cases, the blame game may 
never be resolved. For example, the blame game 
may never end if the institutional environment 
creates a greater level of opacity, preventing the 
evidence to surface (Rodner, Roulet, Kerrigan, 
& Vom Lehn, 2020). Another example would be 
a situation where accused actors deliberately try 
to increase the ambiguity through their discur-
sive responses in the hope of leading audience 
sensemaking astray. It would be interesting for 
future research to account for actors voluntarily 
increasing ambiguity. Further research could 
explore a broader range of accused parties’ com-
munication strategies. A corollary question is 
whether can we consider alternative triggers of 
blame games. Using the concepts of moral and 
attributional ambiguity, we selected precursors 
that fit with our discursive approach in this 
model and a strategic and interest-driven per-
spective on actors’ behaviours. However, we 
can imagine other determinants that also affect 
actors’ choices of blame game strategies – such 
as the severity of the misconduct or the retalia-
tory power of incriminatory audiences (Palmer 
et al., 2016). Second, is a blame game a process 
of redistributing social capital (e.g. legitimacy is 
transferred from one agent to another), or does it 
alter the general level of social capital of a field 
or an organization? Returning to the finance 
example, the fact that a broad range of actors 
were accusing each other turned public opinion 
against them (Ho, 2009). There was no consen-
sus about who was responsible, and the sur-
rounding cacophony required public opinion to 
make radical categorization against the finance 
industry as it was impossible to identify a clear 
culprit at a lower level (Roulet, 2019). Another 
promising area would be to look at the outcomes 
of blame games, particularly in terms of learn-
ing processes (Boudes & Laroche, 2009). How 
do the agents who remain benefit from the blame 
game? Milliken and Lam (2008), for example, 
suggested that voicing concerns contributes to 
organizational learning. However, an organiza-
tion engaged in a blame game may likely lose 
some of its members as a result of them voicing 
concern through whistleblowing, thus jeopard-
izing the learning from such incidents.
Furthermore, future research could explore 
how variations in audiences’ sensemaking pro-
cess influence the blame game strategies of 
accused actors. While we assume that audiences 
actively attempt to make sense of wrongdoing, 
some audiences may instead follow agenda set-
ters such as the media and social control agents 
(Clemente et al., 2016), be ambivalent about sus-
pected actors (Roulet, 2020), and be influenced 
by the social and economic context or by heuris-
tics (Bianchi & Mohliver, 2016). It would be 
interesting for future research to consider how 
these variations influence the reaction of accused 
actors. Specifically, accused actors might follow 
blame game strategies that try to exploit these 
variations to disturb audience sensemaking. For 
example, accused actors might try to manipulate 
agenda setters, or trigger conflict between audi-
ences with ambivalent stances.
Finally, our discursive approach to miscon-
duct could be extended by developing the link 
with material evidence and observable elements 
to understand how the material and the symbolic 
are intertwined. For example, in our blame game 
theorization, the layer of material evidence could 
be considered to be linked to the discursive space 
through the production of text, whereby facts and 
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evidence are given meaning in the discursive 
struggle and become discourse objects (Hardy & 
Phillips, 1999) that are used to construct notions 
of responsibility and morality.
By theorizing how accused actors deal with 
blame, our model also has practical implica-
tions. It could help stakeholders, such as the 
media, regulators, or governments (Greve et al., 
2010), to critically assess the responses of sus-
pected organizations and their members. The 
validity of claims made by scapegoating or 
whistleblowing could be examined, and the 
level of caution to be exercised would depend 
on interpreting the available evidence. When a 
scandal makes organizational misconduct visi-
ble (Daudigeos et al., 2020), stakeholders will 
be tempted to take existing discourses at face 
value, and follow the majority point of view 
(Adut, 2005; Clemente & Roulet, 2015). Our 
framework serves as a useful reminder that the 
discursive positions taken by actors suspected 
of misconduct serve as a strategic tool to influ-
ence the meaning-making of audiences. The 
discursive positions taken by those playing 
blame games can therefore also guide stake-
holders’ search for reliable information. In other 
words, blame game discourses can carry the 
seeds of their de-legitimization: they provide 
crucial pointers for audiences, helping them to 
dig for and interpret further evidence.
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2. We conceptualize scapegoating as an organi-
zational discursive strategy. Texts associated 
with this discursive strategy can be produced 
by individuals that are part of the organization, 
such as top managers, press officers and oth-
ers. However, in the case of an organizational 
discursive strategy, these individuals represent 
the organization as an entity and speak in its 
name. This approach differs from an individ-
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